The Sectarian Council of the Druze Unitarian Sect published the text of the memorandum presented by former President of the Socialist Party, Walid Jumblatt, to the Council, during the special session of its general body, which was held on Tuesday, July 7, 2026.
The Council had adopted the content of the memorandum, and confirmed what was contained therein, after publishing a summary of it in the media statement issued after the session.
“The framework agreement is a dangerous shift in the approach to the conflict with the occupation.”
In the memorandum, Jumblatt warned that the “framework agreement” signed between Lebanon and “Israel,” under the auspices of the United States, reveals a dangerous shift in the approach to the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, as it does not start, according to his opinion, from the priority of ending the occupation and stopping Israeli attacks, but rather redefines the causes of the conflict, and links them to the presence of irregular weapons inside Lebanon, first and foremost Hezbollah’s weapons.
He believed that the agreement shifts the center of the problem from the Israeli occupation to the Lebanese interior, and makes “Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese territory conditional on what Israel and the United States consider a Lebanese success in disarmament and dismantling military structures.”
Conditional withdrawal and gradual redeployment
After reading the fourteen articles of the agreement, Jumblatt considered that the most dangerous thing it contained was not imposing an immediate and clear commitment on “Israel” to withdraw from Lebanese territory, and limiting himself to talking about a “gradual redeployment” linked to verifying that Lebanon is implementing its obligations.
According to the memorandum, this means in practice turning the occupation from a violation of international law, the armistice agreement signed in 1949, UN Resolution 1701, and the Taif Agreement, into a conditional pressure card.
This reality also allows “Israel,” according to the memorandum, to remain in Lebanese territory under the pretext that Lebanon has not accomplished the disarmament of armed groups, or has not proven its ability to monopolize force and weapons.
An American role that goes beyond mediation
Jumblatt pointed out that the agreement gives the United States a role that goes beyond mediation to what he described as “executive guardianship,” by supervising verification operations, coordinating military mechanisms, and linking military and economic aid provided to Lebanon to political and security conditions.
He pointed out that, in this context, reconstruction becomes conditional on an internal security path, which turns Lebanon’s need for economic advancement and rebuilding its damaged areas into a tool for pressure on its sovereign decision.
The memorandum stopped at the thirteenth item related to the cessation of hostilities or “adverse” actions in international political and legal forums, considering it to be one of the most dangerous items of the agreement.
It warned that this clause could be used to restrict Lebanon’s right to file complaints against “Israel,” demand compensation, or prosecute violations before the United Nations and international forums.
Jumblatt believed that the agreement, instead of preserving Lebanon’s legal rights, opened the door to a broad Israeli interpretation that might consider any Lebanese movement against the attacks as a hostile act or in violation of the spirit of the agreement.
Experimental areas leading to the division of the south
The memorandum also warned of the danger of talking, in the third clause, about establishing model or experimental areas, considering that this proposal may practically lead to dividing the south into stages and security areas subject to verification mechanisms.
This means, according to the memorandum, linking the return of residents and reconstruction to field arrangements decided by joint mechanisms over which Lebanon alone does not have control.
She added that the coincidence of these arrangements with Israel’s establishment of crossing gates or field control points would establish a new security reality on the ground, and transform withdrawal from a full Lebanese right, guaranteed by United Nations resolutions and the Armistice Agreement, into a conditional, fragmented, and open-ended process.
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The armistice agreement is more protective of Lebanon
In a comparison between the “Framework Agreement” and the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949, Jumblatt saw that the old agreement, despite the passage of decades since its signing, seemed more protective of the Lebanese position; The armistice agreement was based on the principle of stopping military actions between the regular forces, respecting the armistice line that matches the international borders between Lebanon and Palestine, and preventing any hostile action or military crossing.
It also stipulated the formation of a joint truce committee headed by the United Nations, and not solely under American auspices, which gave it a clear international character.
The memorandum stressed that the armistice agreement stipulated that its provisions would not prejudice the rights, demands, or positions of either party in the final settlement.
Thus, the agreement did not require Lebanon to give up its political or legal papers, nor did it link its internal security to the withdrawal of “Israel,” nor did it make the continuation of the occupation the result of an internal Lebanese failure.
Jumblatt believed that clear reliance on the Armistice Agreement would have allowed Lebanon to adhere to a legal framework that prohibits aggression, confirms international borders not mentioned in the “Framework Agreement,” places violations under the supervision of the United Nations, and preserves Lebanese rights.
This framework, according to the memorandum, would have obligated “Israel” to withdraw unconditionally, while the “Framework Agreement” did not explicitly mention withdrawal, but rather talked about the repositioning of the occupation forces.
Comparison with the May 17 agreement
In comparing it to the May 17, 1983 agreement, Jumblatt considered that the current “framework agreement” is no less dangerous than it, and may even be more dangerous in some of its aspects. The May 17 agreement explicitly stipulated an end to the state of war and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in accordance with a specific annex, but it included security and normalization arrangements and restrictions on Lebanon’s Arab relations, which made it considered an agreement that affected Lebanese sovereignty and restricted Lebanon’s position. Lebanon Regional.
As for the “Framework Agreement,” the memorandum stated that it sometimes avoids using direct language related to normalization, but it goes further than that, by reshaping the Lebanese interior itself. According to Jumblatt, it does not limit itself to imposing border security arrangements, but rather requires the dismantling of a military and political structure inside Lebanon, and links aid, reconstruction, and Israeli withdrawal to the results of this path.
Thus, the agreement turns into an intervention in the structure of the Lebanese state and its internal balances, instead of being merely a security agreement with “Israel.”
The memorandum also indicated that the May 17 agreement included relatively mutual obligations, despite their imbalance and seriousness, while the “framework agreement” gives Israel the position of the party that monitors, waits, and verifies, while Lebanon alone bears the burden of internal implementation.
Jumblatt believed that this flaw makes the current agreement more usable by “Israel,” as it can, when asked internationally to withdraw, use the excuse that the agreement linked this step to disarmament and verification of its completion.
An equation that threatens civil peace
The memorandum concluded that the danger of the “Framework Agreement” lies not only in its provisions, but in the philosophy on which it is based, as it does not treat the occupation as a central cause of the conflict, but rather turns it into a result linked to the Lebanese internal situation.
It also considered that the agreement does not preserve Lebanon’s right to confront violations by legal and political means, but rather places loose restrictions on its international movement, and does not restore respect to the Armistice Agreement, which provided Lebanon with international legal protection.
Instead, according to the memorandum, the agreement replaces the international framework with an American-Israeli framework that opens the door to new security and political guardianship.
Jumblatt warned that Lebanon may find itself facing a dangerous equation, based either on entering into an internal confrontation over weapons, which may threaten civil peace, or on accepting the continuation of the occupation, displacement and attacks under the pretext of incomplete implementation conditions.
In both cases, according to the memorandum’s conclusions, “Israel” has succeeded in transforming its occupation from a clear violation of international law into a negotiating issue linked to the internal Lebanese situation, which it considered to be the most dangerous outcome of the agreement.
